

[redacted]
8 April 1975
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT: Intelligence Coverage of Vietnam

1. Thanks for your memo to [redacted] of 7 April 1975. As you will see, we did not alter our paper (attached) to reflect your comments (other than your proposal in your para. 2, which we did accommodate). We did carefully review the material you mentioned but decided that it either was unnecessary for the DCI's purposes or simply was not persuasive (in the sense presumably intended, i.e., to suggest that we more or less anticipated what has happened in Vietnam).

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2. The OCI memo of 18 November 1974, which you cite, is very good and appropriately pessimistic about Vietnam's future. But its emphasis is almost completely political, and it does not in general convey a sense of impending military crisis or, in its specifics, address the principal problem currently confronting Vietnam. The most telling quotation in your memo ("Under certain circumstances a defeatist psychology could begin to take hold and sentiment for change could begin to snowball.") did not lead your analysts to the judgment that the nation would be in peril but, rather, simply that Thieu would be in jeopardy ("Under such extreme circumstances, Thieu's departure would become a much greater possibility than it is today."). I'm certainly not suggesting that, given the evidence, the memo should have predicted what in fact has happened. But I thought that it did not quite fit into this particular (and narrow) post mortem. (If we must do a bigger and broader one, it then would of course fit.)

3. In any case, if you disagree and wish to pursue this further, I would be happy to discuss at your convenience.

[redacted] MOR/CDF

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[redacted]
Chief, Product Review Division
Intelligence Community Staff

Attachment (SC#03251-75, #12)

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

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